Monetary Testimony

Monetary Testimony

I was invited to prove at the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy in addition to Trade of the House Financial Services Committee on Wednesday. I had exclusively done this i time before in addition to it was a rattling interesting experience.

The proposed bills my beau panelists (John Taylor, Don Kohn, in addition to Paul Kupiec) in addition to I were testifying on  were the Centennial Monetary Commission Act of 2015 in addition to the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 2015. The bills, transcripts, in addition to all testimony are here.


Needless to say, the Taylor Rule was the star of the show, in addition to proposals to restructure the Fed a unopen second. I allow the experts, John Taylor in addition to Don Kohn, speak nigh those issues. I emphasized that the Fed is a lot to a greater extent than than pushing involvement rates around these days, in addition to worries nigh a lot to a greater extent than than inflation in addition to unemployment. So the whole rules, discretion, independence, etc. fighting should comprehend financial regulation in addition to macro-prudential policy.

I also intend the catch that this is an assail on the Fed is wrong. The Fed should welcome limits on its responsibilities, in addition to a clear in addition to happy organisation amongst Congress.

I institute the grade of give-and-take from the congresspeople overall remarkably thoughtful. And I institute the bills themselves quite interesting. Obviously I don't concur amongst every word of the bills, but this is all a piece of work inward progress but an interesting in addition to of import work.

Some surprises inward the Federal Reserve Reform Act,
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Before issuing whatever regulation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall—
  • (A) clearly position the nature in addition to root of the job that the proposed regulation is designed to address in addition to assess the significance of that problem;

  • (B) assess whether whatever novel regulation is warranted or, amongst honor to a proposed regulation that the Board of Governors is required to number yesteryear statute and amongst honor to which the Board has the authorization to exempt sure persons from the application of such regulation, compare—

    • (i) the costs in addition to benefits of the pro- posed regulation; and

    • (ii) the costs in addition to benefits of a regulation nether which the Board exempts all persons from the application of the proposed regulation, to the extent the Board is able;...

  • (E) ensure that whatever proposed regulation is accessible, consistent, written inward acre language, in addition to like shooting fish in a barrel to sympathise in addition to shall measure, in addition to seek to improve, the actual results of regulatory requirements.
So, the Fed is allowed in addition to encouraged to say, The Dodd Frank human activity requires regulation xyz, but, afterward analysis, nosotros intend the whole dominion is featherbrained so we'll transcend it for demonstrate in addition to so exempt everyone from it.

Plain linguistic communication is great. I wonder if i tin give notice challenge a regulation inward courtroom because it was required to live written inward acre language?

That finally clause is important. The Fed must hold rail of regulations in addition to retrospectively evaluate them.

In the large picture, at that topographic point is a lot of give-and-take of how to unwind the tangle of regulation. This is a fascinating novel (to me) approach.

The Monetary Commission bill is likewise a goodness read. If this gets off the ground, it testament live a fascinating debate.  Two excerpts
(11) The Federal Open Market Committee has engaged inward multiple rounds of quantitative easing, providing unprecedented liquidity to financial markets, piece committing to belongings short-term involvement rates depression for a seemingly indefinite period, in addition to pursuing a policy of credit allotment yesteryear purchasing Federal way debt in addition to mortgage-backed securities. 
(12) In the wake of the recent extraordinary actions of the Federal Reserve System, Congress—consistent amongst its constitutional responsibilities in addition to equally it has done periodically throughout the history of the United States—has i time over again renewed its exam of monetary policy.
I was pretty crestfallen when I read that, equally it is pretty much just what I had to enjoin inward my testimony (below). But repeating the betoken inward dissimilar linguistic communication seemed useful.
SEC. 4. DUTIES.

(a) STUDY OF MONETARY POLICY.—The Commission shall—

(1) examine how US monetary policy since the creation of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System inward 1913 has affected the performance of the US economic scheme inward terms of output, employment, prices, in addition to financial stability over time;

(2) evaluate diverse operational regimes nether which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in addition to the Federal Open Market Committee may deportment monetary policy inward terms achieving the maximum sustainable grade of output in addition to job in addition to cost stability over the long term, including—

(A) discretion inward determining monetary policy without an operational regime;
(B) cost grade targeting;
(C) inflation charge per unit of measurement targeting;
(D) nominal gross domestic production targeting (both grade in addition to growth rate);
(E) the utilisation of monetary policy rules; and
(F) the golden standard;

(3) evaluate the utilisation of macro-prudential supervision in addition to regulation equally a tool of monetary policy inward terms of achieving the maximum sustainable grade of output in addition to job in addition to cost stability over the long term;

(4) evaluate the utilisation of the lender-of-last-resort business office of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System equally a tool of monetary policy inward terms of achieving the maximum sustainable grade of output in addition to job in addition to cost stability over the long term; and

(5) recommend a course of study for US monetary policy going forward, including—

(A) the legislative mandate;
(B) the operational regime;
(C) the securities used inward opened upwardly marketplace position operations; and
(D) transparency issues.
This is a pretty sophisticated list. Ok, they didn't add together "determinacy inward new-Keynesian models," but that's a small-scale shortcoming!  It also includes my telephone vociferation upwardly to intend of macro-prudential policy inward the same breath equally involvement rates.

The give-and-take on this i centered on the construction of the committee, amongst to a greater extent than Republicans than Democrats. One of my proudest moments was to turn down to reply questions nigh that political makeup. We're economists, you're politicians, don't enquire us to opine on political questions. I did enjoin I thought it needed to a greater extent than economists, but everybody laughed.

My verbal remarks in addition to longer written testimony follow. The terminal thoughts on monetary policy may live provocative plenty to hold you lot going that far.

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Verbal Summary

Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Moore, in addition to members of the subcommittee: I give thank you lot you for the chance to testify.

It is wise for Congress to rethink the fundamental structures nether which the Federal Reserve operates. I intend the Fed wants guidance equally much equally you lot want clarity.

The Federal Reserve enjoys smashing independence, which is widely viewed equally a goodness thing. However, inward our democracy, independence must live paired amongst express powers. For example, the Fed cannot in addition to does non impress upwardly coin in addition to give it out, no affair how stimulative such activity could be. That is financial policy, which you lot must authorize in addition to the Treasury execute.

Independent agencies should also, equally much equally possible, implement laws in addition to rules, or at to the lowest degree traditions in addition to precedents. The to a greater extent than an way operates amongst broad discretion in addition to sweeping powers, the to a greater extent than it must live supervised yesteryear the imperfect, but accountable, political process.

Your difficult project is to rethink the limits, rules, in addition to consequent independence vs. accountabilty of the Federal Reserve.

Conventional monetary policy consists of setting short-term involvement rates, inward response to, in addition to to stabilize, inflation in addition to unemployment. But the Federal Reserve has taken on a broad gain of novel powers in addition to responsibilities. Even to a greater extent than are beingness contemplated. My primary betoken today is to encourage you lot to aspect beyond conventional monetary policy, in addition to to consider these newly expanded activities, equally this duet of bills start out to do.

Even involvement charge per unit of measurement policy at nowadays goes far beyond inflation in addition to unemployment. For example, should the Fed get upwardly rates to offset perceived “bubbles” inward stock, bond, or abode prices, or to motility the telephone commutation rate? I intend not. But I receive got come upwardly to stress the question, non to offering my answers.

Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 dominion implies a listing of things that the Fed should non respond to, non essay to control, in addition to for which you lot testament non blame the Fed inward the trial of trouble. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 dominion based on inflation in addition to unemployment says, implicitly, don’t manipulate stock prices. This may live a useful interpretation for you lot to emphasize.

But the Fed goes far beyond setting short-term involvement rates. To address the extreme events of the financial crisis in addition to deep recession, the Fed has bought long-term Treasuries, mortgage-backed securities, in addition to commercial paper, inward guild to get upwardly their prices directly. Should the Fed proceed to essay to straight manipulate property prices? If so, when, nether what circumstances, nether what rules, or amongst what supervision in addition to loss of independence?

Since 2008 the Fed’s regulatory role has expanded enormously.  Two examples:

The Fed invented “stress tests” inward the financial crisis. They receive got at nowadays teach a ritual. The Fed makes upwardly novel scenarios to essay out banks each time.

The Fed at nowadays exercises “enhanced supervision” of the “systemically designated” banks, exchanges, in addition to insurance companies. Dozens of Fed staff alive full-time at these institutions, reviewing details of their operation.

These operations follow few rules, they involve smashing discretion, petty reporting or supervision from you, in addition to billions of dollars hang on the results. That is non a goodness long-run combination.

The Fed at nowadays contemplates “macro-prudential” policy, combining regulatory in addition to monetary policy tools in addition to objectives.  The Fed testament vary working capital missive of the alphabet ratios, loan to value ratios, or other regulatory tools over time, along amongst involvement rates, if it sees emerging “bubbles,” or “imbalances,” or to “stimulate.”  Well, the Fed’s “bubble” is the home-builder’s boom, in addition to builders testament will live calling you lot when the Fed restricts credit. Do you lot want the Fed to do this? If so amongst what rules, what limits, in addition to what accountability?

The Reform Act’s  requirements for stress-test transparency, linguistic communication simplicity, in addition to for cost-benefit analysis are of import steps inward managing the regulatory explosion. The authorization inward Section viii for the Federal Reserve to exempt all persons from fifty-fifty  Congressionally mandated regulation, if the Fed finds such regulation unwise, is a landmark. But this must live a tool inward your oversight. Filling out to a greater extent than mountains of newspaper testament non mechanically improve the process.

These are just a few examples. The Federal Reserve’s ambit in addition to powers receive got expanded dramatically since the financial crisis. That’s understandable. New powers in addition to policies, adopted inward crisis, e'er involve smashing experimentation in addition to discretion. Now is the fourth dimension to aspect forward, in addition to to consider their limits, rules, mandates, goals, in addition to accountability.

And these bills are of import starting fourth dimension steps.

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Written (slightly edited)

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy in addition to Trade of the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives
Re the Centennial Monetary Policy Commission Act in addition to The Federal Reserve Reform Act

John H. Cochrane
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
July 22 2015

Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Moore, in addition to members of the subcommittee: I give thank you lot you for the chance to prove on these of import pieces of legislation.

I am John Cochrane. I am a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, a nonpartisan inquiry institute at Stanford University. I stand upwardly for my ain views only.

It is wise for Congress in addition to the Federal Reserve to rethink the fundamental structures nether which the Fed operates. I intend that the Fed wants guidance, in addition to a settled human relationship amongst Congress, equally much equally you lot want clarity. I catch this legislation equally an of import starting fourth dimension pace inward that process.

Principles

Two smashing principles underlie this effort: Independence in addition to rules.

The Federal Reserve enjoys smashing independence.  This independence is almost universally  viewed equally a goodness thing.

However, inward our democracy, independence must live paired amongst clearly express powers. And to the extent the Fed is granted or assumes larger powers, it must lose some of its independence.

For example, the Federal Reserve does non in addition to cannot impress coin in addition to paw it out, or drib coin  by helicopters inward Milton Friedman’s famous story.  This sort of “stimulus” would live rattling powerful. In the depths of the recession, Federal Reserve officials certainly would receive got wanted to do it. Many economists advocated “helicopter drops.” But  the mightiness to write checks to voters inward our commonwealth resides amongst the Treasury subdivision in addition to Congress. And for obvious reasons. Just who gets the checks in addition to how much are deeply political decisions, in addition to exclusively an Administration in addition to Congress which regularly confront the wrath of voters tin give notice brand them.

We also believe inward rules, laws, in addition to dominion of law. We believe that independent agencies in addition to their officials should, equally much equally possible, implement laws in addition to rules, or at to the lowest degree traditions in addition to precedents. They should non number decrees at their discretion. And the to a greater extent than an way follows rules, the to a greater extent than express its powers, the to a greater extent than independent it tin give notice be.

Your task, in addition to the Fed’s, is to rethink the limits on Federal Reserve powers, to develop rules, to save its independence. And where such limits in addition to rules are non possible, to boundary that independence in addition to oversee its decisions inward the refer of citizens, voters, in addition to taxpayers.

Policies

Conventional monetary policy consists of setting curt term involvement rates, inward response to, in addition to amongst an oculus to stabilizing, inflation in addition to unemployment.  Conventional monetary policy was express to buying in addition to selling short-term Treasuries to deport on short-term rates, but testament probable consist inward the time to come of only offering banks higher or lower involvement rates on reserves in addition to inward loans from the Fed.  You receive got heard much nigh rules inward this context, in addition to I intend the nib before you lot does a goodness project of encouraging a fruitful framework for give-and-take betwixt yourselves in addition to the Federal Reserve.

But that is the tip of the iceberg. In the wake of the financial crisis in addition to deep recession, the Federal Reserve has been given (by the Dodd-Frank act) in addition to has taken on a broad gain of novel powers in addition to responsibilities. Even to a greater extent than is beingness hotly discussed, nether the label of “macro-prudential” policy. The Fed’s perceived mandates — the cardinal outcomes it should essay to command — in addition to its tools — what levers it tin give notice line — receive got each expanded.

As natural amongst anything new, this has been a current of smashing experimentation in addition to hence discretion. But equally these experiments merge into regular policy, it is fourth dimension to convey them inward to the park framework.

My primary betoken today, is to encourage you lot to aspect beyond conventional monetary policy, in addition to to consider what rules, mandates, limits, in addition to oversight the Fed testament follow inward these newly expanded roles, or which of these mandates in addition to tools you lot wishing the Fed to halt pursuing in addition to using.

Interest charge per unit of measurement policy at nowadays goes beyond inflation in addition to unemployment. The Fed is defendant of stoking a housing “bubble” amongst also depression rates inward the early on 2000s. Now, the large give-and-take concerns whether the Fed should get upwardly rates to offset a perceived “reach for yield,” high abode prices, stock prices in addition to bond prices.

Well, should the Fed live reacting to, or manipulating mortgage rates, telephone commutation rates, in addition to stock, bond, in addition to housing prices? Is it fifty-fifty appropriate for Fed officials to offering opinions on whether stocks are also high or also low?

I intend not. There is actually no corporation economical agreement of whatever link betwixt the grade of curt term rates in addition to these other assets. The Fed is equally probable to do damage than good, to receive instability inward prices from intense speculation nigh its actions. And manipulating property prices is an intensely political decision, equally the Chinese cardinal depository financial establishment is finding out, requiring a loss of independence. But I receive got come upwardly to pose the question, non to offering my answers

Perhaps the most of import implication of a rule, enjoin linking involvement rates to inflation in addition to unemployment, or a mandate, instructing the Fed to stabilize inflation in addition to unemployment, is the long listing of things that yesteryear implication the Fed should, at to the lowest degree inward normal times, non respond, non essay to control, in addition to for which you, the Congress, testament non handgrip the Fed responsible. This may live a useful interpretation for you lot to emphasize.

The Fed’s arsenal of tools at nowadays goes far beyond setting overnight rates betwixt banks.

In the recession, the Fed tried to manipulate long-term Treasury rates in addition to mortgage-backed security rates, straight yesteryear buying lots of those securities. In the crisis, the Fed also bought commercial paper, to get upwardly those prices. Some cardinal banks purchase stocks.

Should the Fed essay to manipulate property prices directly, yesteryear buying in addition to selling assets? If so, nether what conditions; i.e. amongst what rules, or amongst what supervision in addition to loss of independence? Again, I intend not. But again, you lot receive got to intend nigh it.

Here, the Fed-Treasury separation I praised over financial policy has broken a bit. The Treasury’s Office of Debt Management traditionally manages the maturity of authorities debt inward individual hands, in addition to hence the Treasury’s exposure to involvement charge per unit of measurement risk. In the current that the Fed was buying upwardly long-term debt, trying to cut the amount inward populace hands, the Treasury was issuing lots of long-term debt, trying to increase it. They each undid the other’s actions. Clearly, some accord is needed over who has responsibleness for the maturity construction of the debt.(1)

The Fed is also the prime number financial regulator. Since 2008, nether the Dodd Frank act, in addition to of its ain volition, the Fed’s regulatory role has expanded enormously. “Systemic  stability” is an implicit 3rd or quaternary mandate. And the Fed is contemplating “macro-prudential policy,” combining regulatory in addition to expanded monetary policy tools to gain both macroeconomic in addition to financial goals. What rules in addition to limits testament this attempt respect?

The Fed at nowadays exercises “enhanced supervision” of the “systemically designated” banks, exchanges, in addition to insurance companies. Dozens of Fed staff alive total fourth dimension at these institutions, reviewing details of their operation. This do follows few rules, smashing discretion, in addition to petty accountability to you.

The “stress tests” are i example, which this nib begins to address. The Fed made upwardly this physical care for inward the financial crisis, in addition to it seemed to give confidence inward the banks. But this temporary expedient has at nowadays teach a permanent ritual. The stress tests follow no preset rules. The Fed deliberately tries to surprise the banks amongst novel tests each time.  The thinking goes, I suppose, that if the banks knew the rules ahead of time, equally they know their working capital missive of the alphabet requirements or leverage ratios, they would jigger the books to transcend the tests. But the outcome is a highly discretionary determination yesteryear Fed officials, on which billions of dollars in addition to the competitive fortunes of banks rest. That is non a goodness ground for a permanent policy. I am glad that your nib brings some construction to this enterprise. But non totally glad, equally the nib so institutionalizes stress tests in addition to maybe nosotros should teach rid of them instead.

An before representative is starker. In the robosigning affair, the Federal Reserve joined amongst the US in addition to states Attorneys General, in addition to used its “safety in addition to soundness” regulatory mightiness to strength banks to write downward mortgage principal — non on the robosigned homeowners, but on completely unrelated homeowners — in addition to to give coin to “nonprofit housing counseling organizations.” Writing downward prinicipal — a transfer from depository financial establishment shareholders to homeowners —  is a financial in addition to macroeconomic policy. Whatever its wisdom, it clearly detracts from depository financial establishment security in addition to soundness. Though the representative is small, I intend it provides a clear representative of compromised independence, in addition to the utilisation of regulatory powers to number macroeconomic in addition to financial policy interventions. You may or may non approve; you lot may or may non want the Fed to do such things amongst consummate independence. (2)

The pump of “macroprudential” proposals is the thought that cardinal banks testament vary working capital missive of the alphabet ratios, lending standards (loan to value ratios) or other regulatory tools over time, along amongst involvement rates, to halt emerging “bubbles,” or to “stimulate” equally demand be. The Fed may fifty-fifty essay to constrain depository financial establishment lending inward regions of the country, such equally those amongst high housing prices, or to encourage others. Well, your bubble is my boom, in addition to abode buyers in addition to builders testament live calling you lot when the Fed restricts credit.  These are political decisions. Do they rising to the writing-checks-to voters touchstone that an independent way should non perform? You must determine the limits on this sort of mightiness you lot wishing to impose, in addition to what rules you lot wishing the Fed to follow.

This bill’s requirements for cost do goodness analysis are an of import pace inward managing the regulatory explosion. The costs of regulatory compliance in addition to the costs to competitiveness, innovation, in addition to entry into financial services strike me equally quite large. But i should non hold off the filling out of to a greater extent than mountains of newspaper to mechanically halt the juggernaut, or to a greater extent than importantly to make ameliorate in addition to clearer regulation, peculiarly when so much rule-making is mandated yesteryear Congress itself nether the Dodd-Frank act.

The Reform Act’s requirements for stress-test transparency, linguistic communication simplicity, in addition to for cost-benefit analysis are of import steps inward managing the regulatory explosion. The authorization inward Section viii for the Federal Reserve to exempt all persons from fifty-fifty Congressionally mandated regulation, if the Fed finds such regulation unwise, is a landmark. But this must live a tool inward your oversight. Filling out to a greater extent than mountains of newspaper testament non mechanically improve the process.

The Fed is hotly debating other of import changes. Will it maintain a large residuum sheet in addition to pay involvement on reserves, or revert to the previous rationing of reserves? I prefer the former, for its smashing financial stability benefits. Will it allow people in addition to non-banks to access interest-paying reserves, the most safe, liquid, in addition to run-free property imaginable? People testament similar that, banks testament non similar beingness undercut.

The Task

These are all examples of the momentous changes underway inward our cardinal bank, equally inward other cardinal banks around the world. Just how the Fed should approach these issues, which tools in addition to goals it tin give notice follow piece remaining independent, what rules in addition to legal constraints it tin give notice follow inward its decisions, what the structures of oversight testament be, in addition to how independent it tin give notice rest are of import issues for you, in addition to the Federal Reserve, to decide.

My primary message for you lot today is to utilisation this nib equally a starting fourth dimension pace inward that much broader discussion, in addition to to intend beyond conventional monetary policy.

Final thoughts on monetary policy

In part, monetary policy is not, now, apparently broken. The outcomes nosotros want from monetary policy are, i must admit, nigh equally goodness equally i could hope. Inflation is basically non-existent. Short term rates are equally depression equally nosotros receive got seen inward 2 generations. The labor marketplace position is functioning normally. Economic growth has been steady in addition to bond markets quiet.

Yes, growth is far also slow, non plenty people participate or participate fully inward the labor force, reward are stagnant, in addition to nosotros confront many other economical problems. But these are problems that the monetary policy actually can’t do much about.  Congress asked for cost stability ([which somehow the Fed interpreted to hateful 2% inflation), maximum employment, in addition to depression involvement rates, in addition to nosotros got them. The Fed has express powers in addition to express responsibilities, in addition to the purpose of this nib is to define such limits. Each of us has our ain opinions whether the Fed should get upwardly rates or not, but at that topographic point is no rigid professional person consensus that the Fed is, correct now, doing something dramatically wrong.

This benign outcome is, i must also admit, a scrap of a puzzle. When involvement rates striking zero, traditional Keynesians predicted a deflationary vortex. When the Fed bought nearly iii trillion dollars of bonds, creating novel coin inward exchange, traditional monetarists predicted hyperinflation. The Fed’s ain forecasts — along amongst everyone else’s — receive got been incorrect 7 years inward a row.  With involvement rates stuck at zero, conventional monetary policy has apparently nil to do amongst this outcome. We all receive got our theories - I’ll live glad to fill upwardly you lot inward on mine, if you‘d similar — but at that topographic point is no professional person consensus on how this remarkably benign situation was reached.

Monetary policy is also much less powerful than most commentators — in addition to most Fed officials — testament admit. Money is similar crude inward the car. Not enough, in addition to the automobile testament stop. But i time you lot receive got plenty oil, adding to a greater extent than does non help the automobile to travel faster. Controlling the car’s speed yesteryear slightly starving it of crude is non wise. And to a greater extent than crude testament non substitute for clogged fuel injectors.

Like most commentators, I experience that the Fed’s discretionary monetary policy is damaging, equally evidenced yesteryear financial markets that hang on every sneeze yesteryear Fed officials. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 to a greater extent than predictable policy may add together some stability to financial markets, in addition to enable people who are investing inward businesses to do so amongst to a greater extent than confidence. At to the lowest degree they could live paying to a greater extent than attending to fundamentals in addition to less to parsing Fed officials’ pronouncements. But the combined facts of a benign outcome, at to the lowest degree so far, express scientific agreement of just how monetary policy works, in addition to express mightiness of conventional monetary policy, Pb me to recommend that this non live the primary focus of your efforts.

The massive expansion of Fed responsibilities, the many novel tools it is at nowadays using, in addition to inward particular the temptation to utilisation direct regulatory command to gain nearly unlimited economical objectives, strike me equally the most of import topics for a give-and-take nigh rules, independence, mandates, in addition to accountability.

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Footnotes

(1) See  Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Joshua S. Rudolph, in addition to Lawrence Summers, "Government Debt Management at the Zero Lower Bound." Hutchins Center Working Paper, No. 5, September 2014, for details.

(2) My root hither is the Federal Reserve website, in addition to I applaud the Fed’s transparency inward making these materials public.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20120209a.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20120213a.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20120213a1.pdf


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